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Criminal sentencing does not just happen in the courtroom. Some key 
sentencing decisions happen long before court convenes, while other critical 
sentencing decisions take place long after court adjourns. Although the public 
focuses primarily on the black-robed figure wielding the gavel, sentencing 
reflects decisions by a veritable parade of actors, including legislators, 
sentencing commissioners, police officers, prosecutors, juries, trial judges, 
appellate judges, and executive branch officials.1 All of these people guide and 
constrain the sentencing process. Through their official actions, they inform 
each other about what is happening in their corners of the sentencing drama, 
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1. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L. J. 1681, 1721 & n.198 
(1992) (identifying several sentencers); see also Franklin E. Zimring, Making the 
Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer’s Guide to Sentencing Reform, in 12 OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS FROM THE LAW SCHOOL, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 4-6 (1977) 
(discussing “multiple discretions in sentencing”). 
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and prod their counterparts to respond appropriately. As the Supreme Court has 
written, the federal constitutional design assumes that the branches of 
government “converse with each other on matters of vital common interest.”2 
Many of the points of communication, leverage, and decision that operate 
before the trial judge imposes the sentence—including the congressionally set 
maximum for the offense, mandatory minimums, and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines—have played a central role in the policy and scholarly debate 
following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Less discussed over the past two 
decades—but just as vital—are several devices that can provide important post-
sentencing guidance, communication, and action. These mechanisms can 
enhance a sentencing system’s vitality by providing guidance from “above and 
beyond.” 
This Article explores three post-sentencing tools. Part I advocates for the 
meaningful appellate review of sentences. There are various ways to organize 
such review, and it remains unclear how the federal system will operate after 
the dust settles from the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Blakely v. 
Washington3 and United States v. Booker.4 Regardless, Congress can build on 
the recognized value of sustained and substantial interchange between 
sentencers by taking tangible steps to improve the communicative role of 
appellate review and to reinforce its structural framework. For example,  
Congress can work to reduce appellate conflict over the Guidelines by creating 
a special appellate court, the Court of Appeals for Sentencing, which would 
resolve important questions of sentencing law.   
Part II explores the role of discretionary parole release authority and 
concludes that a modest version of this device can offer significant benefits in a 
post-Booker world. It observes that a properly structured indeterminate 
sentencing scheme, which by definition includes discretionary parole release, 
would both enable Congress to create a more tightly controlled front-end 
sentencing system if it so chose, and to institutionalize communication from the 
back-end sentencers.   
 
2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989). See also Blakely v. 
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Constant, constructive 
discourse between our courts and our legislatures is an integral and admirable part of the 
constitutional design. . . . Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this collaborative 
process.”). 
3. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (finding that the ceiling of a sentencing range calculated 
from legislatively enacted guidelines is the “statutory maximum” which, under the Sixth 
Amendment, cannot be exceeded without a jury’s finding or a defendant’s admission). The 
Blakely Court stated that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for [Sixth Amendment] purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original).  
4. 135 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (making federal Guidelines “effectively advisory” with 
appellate review for “reasonableness” through two, dueling majority opinions). In particular, 
the Court in Booker divided into two, 5-4 majority opinions, announcing separate holdings 
on the merits and the remedy. See id. at 639 (merits majority opinion of Stevens, J.); id at 
651 (remedial majority opinion of Breyer, J.). I assume readers are familiar with Blakely and 
Booker. 
   
Finally, Part III examines the possibility of Extended Sentence Review 
(ESR) for certain long-serving, older offenders. This type of hybrid review—
part clemency and part discretionary parole release—may have an important, 
but limited part to play in modern sentencing. At a systemic level, ESR, by 
evaluating past sentencing decisions, would offer insights and lessons that 
current sentencers can use to craft sentencing policy today. Nevertheless, 
responsible sentencing decisions at the front-end should restrict the need for 
substantial ESR activity. 
I. APPELLATE REVIEW AFTER BOOKER: THE PATH NOT YET TAKEN 
Appellate courts should be key players in the consultative and interactive 
process of sentencing guidance and communication. Appellate review ought to 
be the fulcrum around which guided sentencing systems revolve.5 With their 
dual focus on establishing broad principles of sentencing law and evaluating 
individual cases, appellate courts can bring a distinctive voice to the sentencing 
discussion. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker encourages the 
courts of appeals to take a more active role in conversing with the Sentencing 
Commission and the Congress. At this point, Congress might want to leave the 
specifics of appellate review largely alone and allow the Courts of Appeals to 
resolve some of the post-Booker uncertainty. Nevertheless, Congress should act 
now to improve the structural framework supporting appellate review, which in 
turn will enhance the federal sentencing system. To that end, Congress should 
ban sentence appeal waivers from plea agreements, release all sentencing data, 
and create the Court of Appeals for Sentencing. 
A. Operating Within the Present Framework 
Every jurisdiction has recognized that no set of ex ante rules—be they 
criminal statutes or guidelines—can either anticipate every circumstance or 
provide the appropriate sentence for every case.6 For example, Congress sets 
the maximum punishment, but that is only suitable for the most severe version 
of the offense committed by the most serious offender.7 Sentencing guidelines 
provide suggestions (of varying degrees of authority, or “bite”) just for the 
typical case, leaving sentencing judges with differing levels of bounded 
discretion to do their jobs appropriately.8 This discretion and its boundaries 
 
5. Cf. Joseph A. Del Sole, Appellate Review in a Sentencing Guidelines Jurisdiction: 
The Pennsylvania Experience, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 479, 482 (1992) (arguing that “appellate 
review is a necessary component of an effective guideline system”). 
6. Cf. Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L. J. 271, 275 (2005) 
(“Absolute apparent equality can be demonstrably unjust.”). 
7. Cf. ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994, at 244 (1996). 
(“Statutes set maximum penalties which are not suitable for the majority of convicted 
offenders.”). 
8. Cf. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, supra note 6, at 275 (showing that the 
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serve as part of a web of checks and balances, an approach that serves us well 
in other governmental arenas.9 A key question, of course, is how to construct 
the limits on that discretion. In many systems, appellate courts play a vital role 
in that process as part of the proper functioning of a sensible, guided sentencing 
system.10 As Professor Kevin Reitz explains elsewhere in this Issue, the 
existence and amount of appellate review largely determines whether the entire 
guidelines scheme is more “voluntary” or more “mandatory.”11 
Even in the world before Booker, modern federal district judges possessed 
some discretion and, under certain circumstances, deviated from the otherwise 
applicable Guidelines sentence. In doing so, they gave feedback concerning the 
Guidelines to the Sentencing Commission and Congress. Appellate judges, in 
turn, can give similar feedback in the post-Booker world while serving their 
traditional functions of checking the sentencing discretion of the lower court, 
correcting errors, and developing the law.12 In theory, this kind of feedback 
will facilitate “the continuous evolution of sentencing law and policy within the 
guidelines system.”13 Although perhaps reflecting too much naïveté, this 
“reformist ideal” desires to capitalize on “the interlocking substantive 
lawmaking competencies of the commission and the judiciary.”14 
Booker may yield a system that Congress finds acceptable; if so, appellate 
courts are likely to play a pivotal role. For example, appellate review could 
ensure that district courts continue to take the Guidelines seriously. Although 
Booker produced an “effectively advisory”15 guidelines system policed by a 
reasonableness standard on appeal, the true extent and manner of that review 
 
Sentencing Reform Act “recognized . . . that some variation and individualization of 
sentences was essential to a system of warranted sentences”). 
9. Cf. Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors As Sentencers, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1259 (2004) (“The fundamental lesson of the federal guidelines system, 
however, is that sentencing authority must be shared across several actors to be just. 
Absolute power in sentencing, as in so many other areas, invites abuse.”). 
10. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing A 
Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
21, 34 (2000); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 101, 133-34 (2005). Appellate review, 
however, need not reflect equal power between sentencers. See Kevin R. Reitz, The 
Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. __ (pages 6 - 7) (2005).  
11. Reitz, Enforceability, supra note 10, at __ (page 15).   
12. Cf. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A 
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1451 (1997) 
(referring to “an enforcement mode” and “a creative lawmaking mode,” and noting that 
“there is occasional overlap between these two activities”). For present purposes, it matters 
not if these categories blend together; the goal is simply to highlight these roles. 
13. Berman, Balanced, supra note 10, at 34. 
14. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems, supra note 12, at 1455. On this score, the 
results from the Guidelines’ first fifteen years were less than inspiring. Cf. id. at 1471 
(“[A]ppellate sentence review under the federal guidelines, for most of the guidelines’ first 
decade, has been a far cry from the reformist partnership model advocated in the 1970s.”). 
15. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. 
   
remains obscured.16 The courts can flesh out a “reasonableness” standard of 
review in various ways. It may mean comparatively little or it may result in a 
system similar17 to the pre-Booker regime. 
As of June 2005, only vague appellate trends can be discerned and even 
these may be unreliable because most (if not all) of the decisions involve 
sentences imposed pre-Booker. Nevertheless, it seems as though district court 
judges must still calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range.18 
Sentencing judges cannot ignore the Guidelines on a “whim,” and appellate 
courts will reverse sentences with procedural errors as unreasonable.19 Just as 
they did before Booker, sentencing judges must work through the Guidelines 
(including the departure analysis) and find facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence in order to determine the applicable range.20 In fact, appellate courts 
seem likely to continue to review the Guidelines calculations, interpretations, 
and departures de novo.21 Thus, the Guidelines’ now-advisory sentencing range 
still appears to be rather tightly controlled. 
Once the Guidelines range is determined, the sentencing judge must 
consider all of the statutory purposes of sentencing—including the Guidelines 
range—set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing the actual sentence.22 It 
appears that at least several Courts of Appeals will subject only the imposition 
of the final sentence to the more pliable reasonableness review.23 
What this will actually mean is unknown. The Supreme Court has said that 
the Courts of Appeals must link their appellate review for “reasonableness” to 
the Guidelines,24 but just how close of a link is required or permissible remains 
to be seen. The Second Circuit, in its initial post-Booker pronouncement, 
referred to “reasonableness” as “inherently a concept of flexible meaning, 
generally lacking precise boundaries.”25 Within some still-evolving limits,26 
 
16. See, e.g., Reitz, Enforceability, supra note 10, at __ (pages 11-12, 19).   
17. Presumably, the post-Booker system will be less stringent than the system it 
replaced. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766-67 (“We cannot and do not claim that use of a 
‘reasonableness’ standard will provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to 
secure.”). Justice Scalia predicts that the post-Booker system will permit sentencing judges 
to “apply [their] own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public 
even when these differ from the perceptions of the Commission members who drew up the 
Guidelines.” Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 2005). But cf. id. at 
112 (noting that precise Guidelines calculation may not be required in some limited 
circumstances). 
19. Id. at 113-15. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 115. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 22. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Mathijssen, 406 F.3d at 498; United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2005). 
24. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 766 (2005) (noting that the factors of § 3553(a), including 
the Guidelines, “will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether 
a sentence is unreasonable”). 
25. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115; see also United States v. Bartram, 407 F.3d 307, 313 (4th 
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there may be “more than one right answer.”27 Perhaps this kind of 
“reasonableness” review will primarily aim to remedy significant legal errors 
and eliminate outliers (however defined). Appellate review of differences from 
the now-advisory Guidelines range cannot be exactly what it was before 
without functionally reintroducing the former guidelines system and violating 
the holding of the Booker merits majority. Although the Courts of Appeals may 
be able to come close to the old system by setting common law, appellate 
benchmarks for reasonable sentences, it is possible that this, too, would 
contravene Booker.28 
More broadly, Booker may facilitate better communication between the 
sentencers by encouraging a fundamental review of the Guidelines by the 
federal courts and by retaining (and perhaps invigorating) an important 
feedback tool. In fact, Booker may even spark a “‘common-law-like’”29 
revolution in sentencing by encouraging appellate courts to evaluate (and 
perhaps reject as unreasonable) individual sections of the Guidelines 
themselves in its conversation with the Sentencing Commission and Congress. 
The Booker remedial majority opinion makes clear that sentences within the 
advisory Guidelines range are also subject to appellate review for 
reasonableness.30 No one knows how this will unfold in practice, but it seems 
 
Cir. 2005) (viewing reasonable as “in agreement with right thinking or right judgment”); 
United States v. Fleming, 372 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Although the brevity or length 
of a sentence can exceed the bounds of ‘reasonableness’ we anticipate encountering such 
circumstances infrequently.”). 
26. Cf. United States v. Toohey, No. 04-4565, 2004 WL 75374, at *2 (2d Cir. May 23, 
2005) (evaluating § 3553(a)(6)’s admonition against disparity on a national—not individual 
case—level, thus effectively encouraging Guidelines compliance). 
27. GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 194 (1996) (discussing 
the concept of reasonableness in American law). 
28. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal 
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 25 n.109, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=704602 (last visited Aug. 16, 2005)) (noting issue); David Yellen, 
Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
163, 184 (2005) (“Appellate review that effectively establishes fact-finding requirements . . . 
may run afoul of the Apprendi line of cases.”). 
29. Marc L. Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing 
Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & THE LAW 3, 21 (1989) (coining the phrase in an effort to 
recognize the judicial effort is within a “complex administrative framework in which courts 
recognize the sentencing commission’s role in periodically ‘codifying’ aspects of this 
common law”). 
30. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765 (allowing reasonableness review of sentences both in and 
out of suggested Guidelines range); see also Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 (refusing to hold that 
sentences within an applicable Guidelines range are per se reasonable or that sentences 
outside of an applicable Guidelines range are per se unreasonable); United States v. Webb, 
403 F.3d 373, 385 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to hold that a Guidelines-compliant 
sentence is per se reasonable). But see id. at 386 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that “it is hard to conclude that the amounts or factors the 
Commission selected were not reasonable”). The Crosby and Webb majorities seem to have 
the better side of the argument. If the Guidelines are the infallible touchstone of 
reasonableness (even with some non-Guidelines sentences also being deemed reasonable), 
we would seem to be back in the former and now-invalid world of more “mandatory” 
   
unlikely that the appellate courts will invalidate a sentence within a properly 
calculated Guidelines range lightly. Nevertheless, this ability to engage on a 
topic previously considered largely off-limits—whether the Guidelines 
themselves are reasonable—furthers the dialogue between the various 
sentencers and places sentencing closer to the familiar footing of most other 
rules and regulations. This general idea finds some constructive heritage in the 
Pennsylvania appellate review statute31 and in the ideas of administrative law 
as explored by Professors Ronald Wright and Marc Miller.32 
Furthermore, the Booker remedial majority left an important aspect of the 
old Guidelines system intact: namely, a strong requirement to justify sentences 
that diverge from the Guidelines recommendations. Despite an apparent tension 
with the Booker merits majority, if the sentencing judge decides to vary from 
the properly calculated advisory Guidelines range, she must announce why in 
open court and commit those reasons to paper “with specificity in the written 
order of judgment and commitment.”33 This requirement will not only further 
the conversation between sentencers,34 but it will also encourage sentencing 
judges to take the Guidelines seriously and to think twice before disregarding 
the Commission’s recommendations.35 Some post-Booker courts36 have 
vigorously enforced this statutory requirement to announce and memorialize 
 
Guidelines with occasionally approved departures. But see Reitz, Enforceability, supra note 
10, at ___ (Page 11) (discussing views of Professor Albert Alschuler).  
31. 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 9781 (West 2005). Although the trend may be turning, 
Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have not historically exercised their powers aggressively. 
See, e.g., Reitz, Enforceability, supra note 10, at ___ (Pages 10-11).  
32. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The 
Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 802-10 
(1999); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective 
on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-74 (1991). 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); see also Crosby, 397 F.3d at 116. 
34. Professor Miller put it well more than fifteen years ago: “Full written opinions, 
rather than transcripts or sentencing ‘forms,’ may provide the best source of commentary on 
the sentencing rules selected by a commission, and offer the best hope for further refinement, 
revisions, and reform.” Miller, Not Enough, supra note 29, at 4. 
35. See Reitz, Enforceability, supra note 10, at ___ (Page 10).  
36. The Sixth Circuit recently reversed a downward departure sentence imposed before 
Booker or Blakely because the sentencing judge did not provide sufficient reasons to justify 
the sentence. United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The question 
before us on appeal is what quality of analysis and explanation, if any, is necessary where 
the district court exercises its discretion to vary a defendant’s sentence from the applicable 
range provided by the now-advisory Guidelines.”). The Court of Appeals objected because 
the lower court’s reasoning did not “include any reference to the applicable Guidelines 
provisions or further explication of the reasons for the particular sentence imposed.” Id. at 
305. Implicitly confirming that sentencing courts will often be able to rely on the reasoning 
(if not the actual reasonableness of the Guidelines), the Jackson Court further stated, 
“Booker requires an acknowledgement of the defendant’s applicable Guidelines range as 
well as a discussion of the reasonableness of a variation from that range.” Id. If other 
appellate courts enforce the reasons requirement (let alone adopt this rather aggressive 
substantive link to the Guidelines range), district courts will get the message that they must 
take the Guidelines seriously. Cf. Toohey, 2004 WL 75374, at *1-2 (discussing § 3553(c)). 
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specific reasons for rejecting the recommended sentence, which bodes well for 
substantial compliance with the Guidelines. 
B. Creating a Responsive Guidelines System 
Regardless of the functional level of appellate review and the resulting 
strength of the Guidelines’ bite, Congress can promote a responsive Guidelines 
system in three ways that relate, in varying degrees, to appellate review. By 
banning sentence appeal waivers, releasing all sentencing information, and 
establishing a special sentencing appellate court, Congress can act to limit (1) 
evasion of the Guidelines, (2) stunted development of sentencing law, and (3) 
communication breakdowns within the sentencing system. 
Abolish Sentence Appeal Waivers. First, Congress should statutorily 
eliminate sentence appeal waivers. Sentence appeal waivers, which are often 
memorialized in and agreed to as part of plea agreements, entail the defendant’s 
(and sometimes the government’s) voluntary forfeiture of the statutory right to 
appeal the yet-to-be-imposed sentence. Although regularly enforced by 
appellate courts,37 sentence appeal waivers create often-hidden pockets of 
disparity or even lawlessness.38 While some have argued that defendants 
should have the ability to exchange their appeal right for more lenient 
treatment, there is reason to question how much real trading occurs. It appears 
that a defendant’s ability to extract meaningful concessions from the 
government varies widely across the country.39 As a result of this disturbing 
inconsistency, defendants in some judicial districts are more often able to 
bargain for such things as reduced charges or stipulations limiting the use of 
relevant conduct, while defendants in other districts more often get nothing.40 
Beyond the concerns about inter-district disparity and whether these waivers 
really benefit individual defendants, there are larger, systemic issues at stake 
justifying a ban on sentence appeal waivers.41 How can appellate review 
provide a meaningful check on district courts and valuable feedback to the 
 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993) (Kravitch, 
J.). 
38. Cf. Freed, Unacceptable Limits, supra note 1 at 1739; John C. Keeney, Justice 
Department Memo: Use of Sentencing Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of Sentencing 
Appeals, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 209, 210 (1998) (reprinting memo from Acting Assistant 
Attorney General Keeney) (“The disadvantage of the broad sentencing appeal waiver is that 
it could result in guideline-free sentencing of defendants in guilty plea cases, and it could 
encourage a lawless district court to impose sentences in violation of the guidelines.”). 
39. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 16-22, 26-27, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=772884 (last visited Aug. 
16, 2005)) (discussing empirical study of federal sentencing appeal waivers). 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 575 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., 
concurring specially) (assailing appeal waivers and noting that they “breach . . . the 
Judiciary’s duty to ensure that the goals of Congress and the Sentencing Commission are 
met”). 
   
other sentencers if many cases have escaped review before the sentence is even 
imposed?42 As Professor Doug Berman has astutely noted, “broad appeal 
waivers frustrate Congress’s policy decision in the Sentencing Reform Act to 
utilize appellate review to help eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity.”43 
Release Sentencing Data. Second, Congress must free the sentencing data. 
We can hardly expect appellate courts (not to mention the Commission and 
Congress) to engage in a sophisticated discourse concerning important 
sentencing issues if they do not understand what is happening in the system as a 
whole.44 Despite some limited positive congressional action as part of the 
PROTECT Act,45 much of the information about how specific district judges 
discharge their grave sentencing responsibilities—all of which is nominally 
accessible to the public—remains functionally hidden. This secrecy is 
unjustifiable. Congress should make all46 sentencing information fully and 
readily available to the public, including information about the practices of 
individual judges. “Sentencing data involve public records created with public 
funds reflecting the exercise of a public trust.”47 We should not fear what this 
information might reveal. Indeed, we should welcome the opportunity to know 
as much as possible about our sentencing systems. 
 
42. Critics may raise the concern that an overloaded appellate docket may result if 
Congress abolishes appeal waivers. This perennial doomsday scenario of judges buried by 
their dockets may be factually questionable; no one forces a litigant to appeal (and risk a 
cross-appeal) once the sentence is actually imposed. Furthermore, the evolving appellate 
standard of reasonableness may discourage disappointed litigants from appealing certain 
issues or facilitate streamlined resolution in the Court of Appeals. More importantly, 
however, judicial resource questions should largely be beside the point. If we as a society 
want a sentencing system that actually gives true boundaries for judicial discretion (to 
whatever degree), appellate review must be available. We cannot expect this system to 
function as designed if the parties can preclude appellate review before the judge imposes 
the sentence. 
43. Douglas A. Berman, The Fate and Future of Appeal Waivers (March 4, 2005), 
available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/03/the_fate_and_fu.html 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2005).  
44. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, “The Wisdom We Have Lost”: Sentencing 
Information and Its Uses, 56 STAN. L. REV. __ (ms at 5).   
45. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 994(w)). Indeed, the incomplete and one-sided effort to release judge-specific 
sentencing information was one of the few comparatively bright spots in that legislation. See, 
e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, The Return of Hammurabi, 26 PENN. LAW WEEKLY 390 (2003). 
46. In order to reap the benefits of better aggregate sentencing data, Congress need 
not—and should not—release sensitive, personal information about victims, witnesses, or 
defendants. See Steven L. Chanenson, Statement at Initial Hearing of the ABA Justice 
Kennedy Commission (Nov. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/stevechanenson1.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).  
47. Id.; cf. Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform”: The Sentencing Information 
System Alternative to Sentencing Guidelines, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 145 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (“Judges, scholars and everyone interested in open 
government and wise sentencing should call for judge identifiers to be made public.”); 
Miller, Domination, supra note 9, at 1263 (same). 
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Disclosing this sentencing data, while not free from risks,48 would bring 
many benefits. For example, the mere knowledge that sentencing decisions will 
be easily and publicly available might encourage judges to provide even fuller 
reasons for their sentences and perhaps prompt them to hew closer to the now-
advisory Guidelines.49 Furthermore, this kind of information will enhance the 
communication between the various interested parties. The court of appeals 
will be better able to give meaning to the concept of “reasonableness” if it 
knows how the various district courts in the Circuit exercise their sentencing 
discretion. Similarly, the district courts themselves will benefit from this 
information when striving to impose a “reasonable” sentence in the first place. 
The government and the defense bar might be more inclined to appeal 
sentences imposed by those judges who consistently reject the calculated 
Guidelines range in the hope that this pattern of rejection might garner 
appellate attention. Congress might have a different view of so-called 
sentencing noncompliance if it knew that just a few judges were the cause of 
much of the deviation or that many deviations were small in magnitude. This 
kind of openness, including the full and automatic release of judge-specific 
information, will allow Congress and the judiciary to understand each other 
better. It may even help to reduce the corrosive mutual distrust between these 
two branches of government. 
Establish the Court of Appeals for Sentencing. Finally, Congress should 
consider ways to reduce appellate conflict concerning the Guidelines.50 For 
years, commentators have observed that the various federal Courts of Appeals 
interpret the Guidelines differently.51 Perhaps inter-circuit disagreements 
concerning the Guidelines can explain some of the variation in rates of 
departures across the circuits.52 These disagreements hamper the ability of the 
 
48. One can hope that the sad story of the House Judiciary Committee’s treatment of 
Reagan-appointee Chief Judge James Rosenbaum, who still presides in the District of 
Minnesota, was nothing more than an ugly aberration. See, e.g., Miller, Domination, supra 
note 9, at 1239-40; cf. Mark H. Bergstrom & Joseph Sabino Mistick, The Pennsylvania 
Experience, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 57 (2003) (discussing risks in the context of the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing’s release policy). Yet, it does not change the 
bottom line that the judiciary must publicly disclose this kind of information. See 
Chanenson, Kennedy, supra note 46 (“No one said that judging was easy or for the faint of 
heart.”). 
49. Cf. Bergstrom & Mistick, supra note 48, at 60. 
50. Of course, another potential source of sentencing conflict and disparity stems from 
prosecutorial behavior that may differ from circuit to circuit or district to district. While 
beyond the scope of this Article, Congress and the Sentencing Commission can certainly 
explore ways to regulate or promote the more effective self-regulation of prosecutors. See 
generally Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005). 
51. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Consistently Inconsistent: Circuit Rulings on the 
Guidelines in 1994, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 224 (1995); Nora V. Demleitner, The Nonuniform 
Development of Guideline Law in the Circuits, 6 FED. SENT. REP. 239 (1994); Reitz, 
Enforceability, supra note 10, at __ (Page 18).  
52. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT tbl.26 (2003), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/2003/table26.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2005) (noting for 
   
judiciary to communicate effectively with the Commission and Congress. Long 
ago, the Supreme Court abdicated any active role in reconciling these disputes 
in favor of allowing the Sentencing Commission to handle them.53 The 
Commission, however, has been neither particularly aggressive about resolving 
these conflicts, nor particularly clear or principled in explaining and justifying 
the resolutions it does impose.54 
Congress could respond by somehow exhorting the Commission to step in 
more forcefully. Yet it seems unlikely that Congress can easily or effectively 
impel the Commission to offer a kind of coherent rationale on par with 
appellate court opinions reconciling inconsistent precedent. Furthermore, 
Congress has kept the Commission quite busy in recent years simply 
implementing its long list of directives. 
Congress should establish the Court of Appeals for Sentencing.55 This 
Court would have national subject-matter jurisdiction over at least certain 
aspects of sentencing law. In that way, it would be somewhat—but not 
completely—analogous to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
supervision of patent appeals. While Congress could direct this new Article III 
court to handle all criminal appeals, a less dramatic and disruptive option is 
available. 
Specifically, Congress could require the Court of Appeals for Sentencing 
to resolve unsettled questions of sentencing law or Guidelines interpretation56 
through a mandatory certification process triggered by request of a litigant or 
sua sponte by the traditional appellate court.57 It might even be possible for the 
 
example, that 59.6% of Ninth Circuit sentences were within the Guidelines range while 
74.5% of Eleventh Circuit sentences were within the Guidelines range). 
53. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-49 (1991). 
54. See, e.g., Miller & Wright, Wisdom Lost, supra note 44 (manuscript at 4) (noting 
that the Commission has “acted like a Supreme Court for Sentencing, but without issuing 
opinions or reasons” and that “it has developed weak habits of explanation and 
justification.”); Andrew D. Goldstein, Comment, What Feeney Got Right: Why Courts of 
Appeals Should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 113 YALE L. J. 1955, 1985 (2004) 
(“The problem is that when the Commission plays the role of Supreme Court to resolve 
conflicts among the circuits, it almost never explains or justifies its resolutions, turning the 
Guidelines into ‘administrative diktats’ rather than carefully reasoned and explained rules.”); 
see also Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court: 
Responding to Circuit Conflicts, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 142 (1994). 
55. This proposal builds on an idea first raised more than a dozen years ago by Steven 
Zipperstein. See Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 656 (1992) (proposing “a single national 
court of sentencing appeals”). 
56. Cf. Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 712-14 (2001) (discussing distinct, 
but intertwined, appellate court functions of error-correction and law-making); Douglas A. 
Berman & Jeffrey O. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief 
Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 2025, 2035-36 (1999) (same). 
57. Cf. Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified 
Questions A Good Idea or a Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 336-39 (2004) (discussing 
process of federal court certification of questions to state supreme courts and the Uniform 
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parties to seek rehearing before the Court of Appeals for Sentencing of 
legal/interpretive issues they feel were improperly decided by the traditional 
appellate court. The pronouncements of the Court of Appeals for Sentencing 
would be binding on all other appellate courts and on all district courts 
throughout the country. The workload would be quite heavy at first, but should 
eventually recede. Given the comparatively limited role of this conception of 
the Court of Appeals for Sentencing, it should be possible to staff it with just a 
few jurists, thus encouraging internal cohesion. 
Potential benefits of this Court of Appeals for Sentencing include the more 
consistent (and perhaps more thoughtful) exposition of sentencing principles. 
Indeed, this vision of the new appellate court could help to reduce Justice 
Scalia’s fears, expressed in his Booker dissent, that “‘unreasonableness’ review 
will produce a discordant symphony of different standards, varying from court 
to court and judge to judge . . . .” 58 By speaking with one appellate analytic 
voice on matters of broad sentencing policy, the judiciary would communicate 
more effectively with the Commission and Congress. 
After Booker, some observers are understandably concerned about the 
ability of the Guidelines to promote the congressionally desired amount of 
sentencing uniformity. Although preliminary statistics reveal increased 
deviation from the Guidelines, the appellate courts have yet to have their say. 
We should be careful not to judge this brave new sentencing world too quickly. 
If the Courts of Appeals take an expansive and internally consistent view of 
their post-Booker responsibilities, they may restrain those sentencing judges 
who would otherwise desire to dismiss the Guidelines rashly. In fact, Booker 
may actually inspire a golden age of meaningful guidance and communication 
from “above.” Congress can nurture such a salutary development by acting to 
reinforce the superstructure of appellate review. 
II. DISCRETIONARY PAROLE RELEASE: A NEW LIFE FOR AN OLD IDEA 
Although discretionary parole release is largely off the national sentencing 
reform radar, it remains a vital part of American criminal justice. In fact, 
indeterminate sentencing regimes—that is, systems with discretionary parole 
release59—continue to be the most common approach to sentencing in the 
United States.60 In an indeterminate system, the trial judge announces the 
nominal sentence at the front-end. However, it is the parole board, acting as a 
back-end sentencer, which determines the actual incarceration length by 
deciding if or when to grant the inmate discretionary parole release. Through its 
release behavior, parole boards offer another form of communication between, 
 
Certification of Questions of Law Act promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 
58. 125 S. Ct. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
59. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 
377, 381-86 (2005) (discussing terminology). 
60. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 212 (2004).  
   
and guidance for, sentencers. 
The romantic vision of discretionary parole release involves a wise parole 
board divining, based in large part on assessments of an inmate’s rehabilitative 
progress, when an inmate should be released, and thus producing a just result. 
The reality can be quite different. Parole release has historically been an 
unstructured and wildly discretionary power, subject to the same kinds of 
irrationalities and abuses that afflict old-style, fully discretionary judicial 
sentencing on the front-end.61 It is also questionable at best whether parole 
boards are able to make meaningful predictions about inmates’ future criminal 
behavior.62 Traditional discretionary parole release often comes at a significant 
cost in terms of deterrence, perceived fairness, sentence predictability, and 
resource allocation.63 Indeed, these are some of the reasons why Congress 
abolished discretionary parole release as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.64 
Yet, in the wake of Blakely and Booker, there may be new life for a 
reformed and coordinated version of discretionary parole release. Elsewhere, I 
have proposed a system of Indeterminate Structured Sentencing (ISS).65 An 
ISS system includes guidelines for both sentencing and parole release within an 
indeterminate sentencing structure. ISS allows for more fully binding front-end 
sentencing guidelines; it permits sentencing guidelines that in a determinate 
sentencing scheme would now be prohibited by Blakely and Booker. It also 
allows for any level of appellate review, including review closely linked to 
more “mandatory” guidelines. For example, appellate review of ISS sentencing 
guidelines could include explicit, multi-tiered standards of review as advocated 
by the American Law Institute’s draft sentencing proposal.66 
At the center of the ISS system is a “Super Commission” that promulgates 
two sets of coordinated guidelines that constrain and guide both sentencing and 
release powers. This Super Commission takes the place of and has all the 
qualities of the traditional sentencing commission, but it possesses expanded 
powers to channel back-end parole release authority as well as front-end 
sentencing authority. Reflecting the best ideas of pre-Blakely guideline 
schemes, ISS sentencing guidelines channel a trial judge’s decisional authority 
while maintaining important repositories of judicial discretion. Through its 
parole release guidelines, ISS encourages the predictable exercise of 
 
61. See, e.g., Chanenson, Next Era, supra note 59, at 450. 
62. See, e.g., id. at 453-55. 
63. See, e.g., Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 10, at 1222. 
64. It is interesting to recall that some systems of discretionary parole release 
underwent their own substantial reform similar to—but before—structured sentencing. See, 
e.g., DON M. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 23, 70 (1978) 
(describing a parole guidelines model in which parole board sets severity ratings for 
offenses). Many of these reforms focused largely on issues that could and should have been 
determined upfront rather than in post-sentencing forums. 
65. See Chanenson, Next Era, supra note 59, at 432-58. 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ (Preliminary Draft No. 3 2004). 
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discretionary, yet humbly conceived, parole release authority. 
At a practical level, judges operating under an ISS system impose a 
“minimum” and a “maximum” sentence—for example, two to four years—for 
virtually all sentences of incarceration. The minimum sentence is the least 
amount of time an offender will spend in prison. The maximum sentence is the 
most time an offender can be required to spend in prison or, once released, on 
parole supervision. ISS presumptive sentencing guidelines address only the 
judge’s imposition of the minimum term, not the maximum term. The judge’s 
ability to impose a maximum sentence up to and including the traditional 
statutory maximum set by the legislature for the offense of conviction is 
unguided and unconstrained; the guidelines simply do not speak to the 
imposition of the maximum sentence. In the ISS system, the traditional, 
legislative statutory maximum is thus the same as the Blakely statutory 
maximum.67 As such, neither Blakely nor Booker impinge on ISS presumptive 
sentencing guidelines.68 
A defendant will be eligible for parole release at the expiration of his 
minimum sentence, but it will be the parole board—exercising its discretion as 
guided by the Super Commission—that decides precisely when to release the 
inmate on parole. As noted above, the parole release power that results from 
this indeterminate system is a considerable and potentially troubling limitation 
of the ISS model. Nevertheless, it is possible to lessen this difficulty through a 
modest conception of the role of parole release authority and comprehensive 
parole release guidelines. The Super Commission’s parole release guidelines 
would direct the exercise of the parole board’s discretionary release power and 
would usually work to channel the board’s discretion in favor of releasing 
inmates at or near the expiration of their minimum sentence.69 
The Super Commission would recognize that because the sentencing judge 
typically has superior information about the offense, the judge’s retributive 
judgment—channeled by the sentencing guidelines and expressed through the 
minimum sentence imposed—is entitled to substantial weight in the parole 
release process. Accordingly, ISS parole release guidelines generally encourage 
the parole board to exercise its discretion to grant parole release at or near the 
expiration of the typical defendant’s judicially imposed minimum sentence. 
Yet, the parole release guidelines would both provide for circumstances when 
release upon the expiration of the minimum sentence is presumptively 
inappropriate (such as if an inmate violates prison rules), and permit departures 
when appropriate. 
Acting as the central coordinator of the jurisdiction’s sentencing and 
punishment policy, the Super Commission “harmonize[s] otherwise potentially 
 
67. See supra note 3. 
68. See, e.g., Chanenson, Next Era, supra note 59, at 436-40. 
69. Not only must the Super Commission guide the parole board, the board must 
exercise its guided discretion openly, with appropriate process, and subject to some form of 
review. Id. at 446-58. 
   
conflicting sentencing and parole release principles.”70 This is possible, in part, 
because the ISS approach offers bounded judicial sentencing discretion that is 
policed by meaningful appellate review but, as noted above, is unconstrained 
by Blakely and Booker.  
Under the ISS approach, vital communication from “beyond”—here, 
including the paroling and prison authorities—is hard-wired into an 
overarching system of sentencing and release. For example, the legislature and 
the Super Commission will study the actual parole release dates, which 
themselves are subject to guidelines and appellate review, and decide how that 
information influences (or does not influence) the upfront sentencing guidance. 
By including release policies in the conversation, sentencers may also be more 
inclined to concentrate on the vital issue of how those released prisoners reenter 
society. An ISS regime institutionalizes front- and back-end communication 
through the Super Commission while allowing the legislature to select any 
level of guidelines enforcement it desires. 
III. EXTENDED SENTENCE REVIEW: SO THE PRESENT CAN LEARN FROM THE 
PAST 
We know that both appellate review and a modestly conceived 
discretionary parole release authority can provide beneficial post-sentencing 
guidance and communication to actors situated earlier in the process. Yet what 
informs our upfront sentencing judgments in the first place? Could we benefit 
from a long-term feedback mechanism focusing on some of the consequences 
of our actions? Perhaps we can develop a device to help inform our front-end 
retributive judgments by evaluating some of the aftermath of our previous 
determinations. 
One such instrument could be a form of Extended Sentence Review (ESR). 
ESR calls for a panel of experienced sentencing professionals, acting through 
either a legislative mandate or delegated executive authority, to evaluate older 
inmates who have already served long periods of incarceration (i.e., fifty years 
old with at least fifteen years in custody),71 and determine who (if anyone) 
should be released to some form of community supervision.72 
 
70. Chanenson, Next Era, supra note 59, at 434 
71. In designing an ESR system, opinions would, of course, vary as to who is “older” 
and how long is a “long period” of incarceration. See, e.g., RONALD H. ADAY, AGING 
PRISONERS: CRISIS IN AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11-12 (2003) (noting that there is “no 
uniform agreement about what constitutes ‘long-term’”). As for the definition of older, the 
age of fifty seems to be a line of demarcation in the correctional world. Id. at 16. Given the 
desire to provide guidance from “beyond” and the extraordinary nature of ESR relief, a very 
conservative definition of fifteen years for long-term sentences seems appropriate, although 
reasonable minds could certainly differ on this point. See, e.g., Timothy J. Flanagan, Long-
Term Incarceration, in LONG-TERM IMPRISONMENT 4 (Timothy J. Flanagan ed., 1995) 
(describing evolution of his views of long-term imprisonment from five years in 1970s to 
eight to ten years in the mid-1990s). 
72. Congress has already provided for a provision somewhat analogous to ESR. 
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ESR operates on both an individual and a systemic plane. At the individual 
level, the ESR process is a blend of clemency (and compassionate release),73 
and, perhaps disturbingly,74 old-fashioned discretionary parole release.75 
Reflecting clemency’s substantial role in this procedure, the ESR panel would 
consider questions of mercy, forgiveness, the risk to public safety, and 
utilitarian concerns such as the increasing cost of incarcerating older inmates. 
Indeed, ESR would focus on an inmate population that some people think is 
deserving of mercy in any event—long-serving, older inmates76—and help to 
guide the use of these arguably anomalous77 sentences in the future. 
Ultimately, the systemic and communicative functions of ESR are its most 
significant aspects. The idea is to adjust today’s sentencing arithmetic in light 
 
Inmates serving a three-strikes sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) who are at least 
seventy years old and have been incarcerated for at least thirty years, may be released if the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons concludes that they are not a danger to any other person or 
to the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
As a matter of fairness, ESR should not be available for some inmates. For example, 
those inmates who received a sentence of natural life instead of the death penalty should 
likely be ineligible for ESR. Of course, the President and most governors would still have 
the ability to pardon or commute this kind of sentence. However, they would have to issue 
the pardon or commutation in the traditional, open, and political environment. 
73. Federal compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling” reasons is 
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but that sentence-reducing provision is rarely 
used and then often for prisoners who are close to death. See Mary Price, The Other Safety 
Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT. REP. 
188, 188 (2000). 
74. See, e.g., Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 10, at 1222 (discussing 
concerns). Some commentators have advocated for the return of, essentially, discretionary 
parole release for long-term inmates. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 60, at 19 (2004); id. at 
215-16 (advocating for a “safety valve” law that allows early release consideration for 
inmates sentenced to more than ten years who have served the lesser of five years or one-
third of their sentence, with re-examinations every two years). This approach, however, may 
spark some of the same problems and pitfalls of traditional, unguided discretionary parole 
release. The harder, but more desirable, approach is to get it right on the front-end. At the 
aggregate level, ESR can help that process by informing the sentencers of today about some 
of the consequences of their predecessors’ actions. At the individual level, ESR offers a 
limited opportunity for society to exercise self-interested compassion that may result in 
financial and human savings at little cost to public safety. Sadly, ESR decisions at the 
individual level are unlikely to be completely costless. Some of the released inmates will 
commit crimes while on ESR-granted community supervision, although they may have done 
so years later upon their normal release as well. 
75. In some situations, clemency and parole release have already had an intertwined 
relationship. For example, parole in California “was proposed, and used for more than a 
decade, selectively to provide ‘early’ release for prisoners serving ‘excessive’ terms. As 
such, it was intended as a partial substitute for executive clemency.” Sheldon L. Messinger 
et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW & SOC. REV. 1, 1 (1985). 
76. Cf. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 10, at 1221 (criticizing 
discretionary parole release but noting that “reassessments of the continuing need for 
custody seem especially important for offenders serving very long prison terms”). 
77. The mean federal prison sentence imposed in 2003 was fifty-six months, while the 
median sentence imposed was thirty-three months. UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2003). 
   
of information about past sentencing policies and decisions gleaned from the 
ESR process. Looking at these offenders at a different point in time may allow 
us to reevaluate the wisdom of our decisions that sent them there long ago. Is 
our retributive judgment sufficiently robust to determine reliably that fifteen 
years, as opposed to, say, ten, is the appropriate sentence? Are our retributive 
notions at the time of sentencing sufficiently refined once we start to consider 
“long-term” sentences? Or does projecting so far into the future have a 
distorting effect on our judgment? Have what Professor Michael Tonry calls 
“moral panics”78 skewed our previous retributive judgments? Perhaps looking 
at an aggregation of these ESR cases—the consequences of sentencing policies 
and decisions from the past—can offer us insights on the challenges and “moral 
panics” we face today. 
This kind of ESR review is particularly important now because of the 
rapidly rising and record-breaking federal prison population, fueled in part by 
long-term sentences.79 Indeed, the relatively narrow ESR target group of 
inmates age fifty or older with fifteen or more years in custody still yields a 
rather large federal population. At the end of FY 2003, 1617 inmates met these 
criteria.80 Of that group, the plurality (584) were convicted of drug offenses.81 
Given that federal drug mandatory sentences were still new and ultimately 
incomplete82 in 1987 (fifteen years before this data year), this group of federal 
ESR-eligible offenders may well grow in the years to come. 
The judicious composition of the ESR panel can bolster its effectiveness as 
 
78.  TONRY, supra note 60, at 5 (stating that moral panics “typically occur when 
horrifying or notorious events galvanize public emotion, and produce concern, sympathy, 
emotion, and overreaction”). 
79. See, e.g., PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004 tbl.1 (2005) (describing federal 
prison population of 179,210 as of June 30, 2004); see also ADAY, supra note 71, at 11 
(“Since 1980 long-term incarceration has become a major contributor to the explosion of the 
American prison population.”); id. at 12 (“The average percentage of inmates serving twenty 
years or more remained steady from the early 1990s to 2000, but the overall number of long-
term inmates increased dramatically during the same period.”); Flanagan, supra note 71, at 3 
(“Long-term incarceration is a major factor in the explosion of the American prison 
population in the last 15 years.”).  
Furthermore, Professor van Zyl Smit reports “a persistent increase in overall numbers 
of lifers and of other long-term prisoners of all kinds in the system” from 1989 to 1999, 
based on data covering many states and frequently the federal system. DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, 
TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY 24-25 (2002). 
80. Federal Bureau of Prisons, SENTRY data file, FY2003, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program (on file with author). In this data snapshot, the inmates’ age was calculated as of 
Sept. 30, 2003. 
81. Id. As categorized by the Bureau of Prisons, (i) 580 inmates were convicted of 
violent offenses, including 300 for robbery, (ii) 181 were convicted of property offenses, 
including 5 arson and explosives offenses, (iii) 143 were convicted of public-order offenses, 
(iv) 83 were convicted of weapons offenses, (v) 33 were convicted of immigration offenses, 
and (vi) 13 were convicted of unknown offenses. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 6371, 6470(a), 6481, 102 Stat. 4181, 4377 
(1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 846, 848(a)) (expanding, in part, drug 
mandatory minimum penalties to conspiracies). 
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a guidance and communication tool. Experienced sentencers who are likely to 
continue to shape the sentencing system for years to come are the ideal 
candidates. Mid-career sentencing professionals—including judges, legislators, 
sentencing commissioners, correctional officers, prosecutors, defenders and 
even academics—seem to fit that bill. Perhaps we can think of the systemic 
aspect of ESR as an advanced sentencing school.83 At the individual level, the 
students study these older, long-serving inmates and decide whether to grant 
release. Moving to the systemic arena, the students seek out larger lessons and 
relevant trends from the inmates as a group, and then go on to educate other 
people who are making sentencing decisions now. 
Although sharing some lineage with discretionary parole release, ESR is a 
different animal. Contrary to the parole release model proposed above as part 
of a system of Indeterminate Structured Sentencing, release at the time of 
review cannot be presumed. In fact, the rebuttable presumption may be in favor 
of continued incarceration. After all, the ESR process is swimming against the 
considerable tide of the retributive judgment expressed by the sentencing court, 
itself informed by the actions of such other sentencers as the Congress and the 
Commission. Some offenders deserve to remain in prison for fifteen years, 
twenty years, or even their natural lives. Principles of just deserts and public 
safety demand no less.84 Yet, can we always be certain of our retributive 
judgments rendered at least a decade and a half earlier?85 
Reasonable minds can and will differ as to how many inmates should be 
released pursuant to ESR procedures. Some people believe that virtually all 
properly convicted inmates deserve to remain incarcerated as sentenced. 
Others, however, believe that at least some inmates should have been released 
long ago.86 Regardless of the resolution of this question in individual cases, the 
 
83. As a Professor, I try to expose my students to some of the consequences of crime 
and punishment for both victims and offenders. Concerning the offenders, I encourage my 
sentencing students to visit a maximum-security prison with me. I do not do so out of a 
desire for the students to have sympathy or scorn for the inmates. Rather, I do so for the 
students to begin to have an understanding of some—and only some—of the consequences 
of our punishment decisions. It is very easy to throw around large numbers when it comes to 
incarceration. If five is good, ten must be better and fifteen better still. ESR, like those 
student visits to the prison, may help sentencers understand more of the consequences of 
their decisions and the decisions of their predecessors. 
84. Cf. Daniel J. Freed & Steven L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 
13 FED. SENT. REP. 119, 123 (2000) (“As a general matter, considerations of crime control 
are of vital importance whenever clemency is contemplated. There are many crimes for 
which lengthy prison sentences are appropriate.”). 
85. There is reason to believe that even some of today’s prosecutors question the 
Guidelines’ retributive judgments in certain cases. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III & 
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug 
Sentences Including Date from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 559 (2002) 
(“[P]rosecutors, and the judges they appear before, use their discretion liberally, but 
irregularly, to reduce drug sentences.”). 
86. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Murder, Meth, Mammon and Moral Values: The 
Political Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495, 507 (2005) 
(asserting that “both social science and commonsense tell us that thousands of prisoners are 
   
crucial point is the willingness to question our own judgment, re-examine our 
own assumptions, and apply the resulting knowledge in a methodical way.87 
Many federal sentences today are more severe than they were before 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act.88 Have we made the right 
decisions? Are we sure that the push for longer terms of incarceration over the 
past decades was the right path? ESR is one way to evaluate that query. 
Exposure to the feedback afforded by the ESR “school” might help to prevent 
sentencing policy makers from “los[ing] their senses of humility and proportion 
and los[ing] sight of timeless values.”89 ESR can help us communicate about 
and capitalize on changes in thinking about crime that have not yet translated 
into changes in policy.90 
Ultimately, if society is careful and humble about its sentencing policies on 
the front-end, ESR should not yield many releases. But ESR can act as a 
limited fail-safe for those situations when our retributive judgments—at least as 
seen through contemporary eyes—were lacking. ESR can help us to understand 
the consequences of yesterday’s judgments and actions, while striving to 
improve tomorrow’s reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of a particular system’s specific contours, the preferred 
approach to guided sentencing embraces the constitutionally inspired technique 
of checks and balances promoted by a dynamic interchange of guidance and 
ideas between sentencers. A disappointingly small portion of that ideally 
vibrant conversation comes from “above and beyond” the sentencing judge. 
Yet we can give life to those presently quiet voices. By encouraging 
meaningful appellate review, and deploying other devices, such as ESR, to 
promote a richer sentencing discourse, Congress can continue to move the 
 
being kept behind bars for years, and sometimes decades, past the point at which they 
represent a really significant risk of doing more serious harm”).  
87. Cf. Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing and Data: The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16 FED. 
SENT. REP. 1, 4 (2003) (“We must acknowledge the boundaries of our knowledge . . . to 
prompt us to periodically re-examine the decisions we make. . . . A healthy dose of humility 
may keep us from getting perilously set in our ways.”). 
88. See Yellen, supra note 28, at 182-83. 
89. TONRY, supra note 60, at 167. 
90. Of course, just knowing about potential problems with any existing theory—
including a sentencing theory—may not be enough to overcome our natural tendencies to 
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